Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Accommodating Free Speech and Gender Equality Values by Strossen, Nadine
digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship Articles & Chapters
1993
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace:
Accommodating Free Speech and Gender Equality
Values
Nadine Strossen
New York Law School, nadine.strossen@nyls.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation
Strossen, Nadine, "Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Accommodating Free Speech and Gender Equality Values" (1993). Articles &
Chapters. 1184.
https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters/1184
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace:
Accommodating Free Speech and Gender
Equality Values
Nadine Strossen
I am deeply honored to participate in this important, stimulating gathering. I actually
read through the entire convention catalogue, with its descriptions of the more than 700
programs you have scheduled. This provided a fascinating overview of the many diverse
issues that your members are exploring-a true intellectual feast!
I must admit, it is a little intimidating to be giving a speech before an audience of
professional speech teachers and critics! I hope you will judge my performance charitably,
recognizing that I have far less formal training in public speaking than many of you.
Contrary to the article about me that appeared in the September, 1992, issue of the
Association's publication, Spectra, I did not do any college-level debating. Not that I
didn't want to or try to; I certainly did. But I went to Harvard-Radcliffe College back in the
days before coeducational living. While all our classes were coeducational, extracurricular
activities such as debate were based in the male-only residential houses at Harvard College,
while all female students lived at Radcliffe College.
Therefore, in one fell swoop, I was denied both equality rights and free speech rights.
This experience was certainly my loss, but perhaps it was the ACLU's gain; experiences
such as this certainly shored up my resolve to become a human rights activist! Looking
back on such experiences twenty-five years later, I realize how much progress has been
made, even in one generation. That is an encouraging perspective, and counters my
sometimes overwhelming awareness of how much progress is yet to be made.
Dedication to Charles Caruson
Because of the gender discriminatory policies at my college a generation ago, my only
formal training in forensics was in high school. I was on the Minnesota state championship
team from Hopkins High School, in Hopkins, Minnesota, two years in a row, 1967
and 1968. High school debate was definitely one of my most important educational
experiences-perhaps the most-in my entire life, not only in terms of oral advocacy
skills, but also more generally, in terms of research, analysis, and critical thinking.
In fact, I would like to dedicate this keynote address to my extraordinary high school
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debate coach, Charles Caruson. I truly do not think I would be standing here before this
important audience today, in my capacity as President of the American Civil Liberties
Union and Professor of Law at New York Law School, were it not for all that I learned
from him.
I recently learned that Charles Caruson died suddenly, in August, 1992. Now it is too
late for me to thank him directly for the enormous constructive impact he had on my
life. But it is not too late for me to thank all of you-on behalf of all of your students,
including the many who are too busy or too shy to express this thought to you themselves.
I know that all of you are transforming your own students' lives in the same positive
way that Charles Caruson transformed mine. And I also know that your students will in
turn carry that spark of inspiration, of excitement, of intellectual awakening, on to the
next generation. That is because so many of them will be moved by your example-as
I was moved by Charles Caruson's outstanding example-to become teachers themselves.
I cannot think of any more important mission in life-or, I might add, any more
important form of human rights activism-than what Charles Caruson did for his students
and what you do for yours: touching young minds, challenging them to think critically,
and to express themselves effectively. So, to each of you: my sincerest thanks. You are
pursuing a noble calling.
A New Legal Challenge Presented by "The Communication Century"
Now let me turn to the theme of this Convention: "The Communication Century." As
David Zarefsky said in his welcoming statement, published in the Convention Catalogue,
in this exciting communications age, "We've seen the personal computer, the cellular
telephone, and FAX machine change the way we live." I have certainly witnessed all of
these developments first-hand, because my husband, Eli Noam, is a telecommunications
guru. He is the founding director of the Columbia Institute for Tele-Information, or
"CITI," at Columbia University. Eli's involvement in telecommunications has given his
mother a new variation on the age-old maternal lament. Lately she complains to Eli:
"You never call; you never write; you never FAX"!
Consistent with the Convention's broad, forward-looking theme, I decided to discuss
a very current, challenging and unresolved free speech controversy: the extent to which
speech or expression in the workplace may be treated as prohibited sexual harassment.
This is an especially timely subject, in the wake of Professor Anita Hill's charge that
Clarence Thomas had sexually harassed her before he was nominated to the Supreme
Court. That controversy catapulted the issue of workplace sexual harassment to the
forefront of public consciousness. Previously, the issue had received relatively little
attention in general. Likewise, scant attention had been paid to the specific aspect of
workplace sexual harassment that I'm addressing: the tension between free speech and
equality values when sexual harassment claims are based on expression, as they often
are.
It is ironic that so little attention had been paid to this issue, because it is very similar
to another issue that has received enormous attention: the regulation of campus hate
speech or harassment-i.e., the extent to which colleges and universities may prohibit
expression that harasses on the basis of race, gender and other invidious classifications.
This subject has been the focus of judicial rulings,1 as well as numerous articles in law
reviews and other publications. 2
In contrast to the highly analogous issue of free speech in the campus harassment
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace
context, the issue of free speech in the workplace harassment context has received scant
judicial or scholarly attention, despite the fact that expression has been deemed to be
prohibited harassment in the workplace since at least 1981. (Campuses did not begin to
debate or to adopt hate speech codes until the late 1980s.) The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission issued guidelines that classified certain expressive conduct as
proscribable workplace harassment in 1981. Since then, in numerous cases, judges have
been treating employees' speech as punishable harassment, and issuing orders prohibiting
such speech.3
Although the courts have adjudicated numerous workplace sexual harassment cases in
which the complained-of conduct constituted expression, almost none have even acknowl-
edged that First Amendment values were implicated, let alone seriously discussed that
aspect of the cases.4 The reason was probably that the lawyers, as specialists in employment
law, did not raise free speech concerns until recently, when they became aware of
the free speech arguments being raised in the comparable campus harassment context.
Accordingly, there has not been a single fully litigated case focusing on the proper
accommodation between free speech and gender equality values in the workplace sexual
harassment setting. Now, though, two such cases are working their way through the
judicial system. One is a complaint by Lois Robinson against Jacksonville Shipyards,
Inc., in Jacksonville, Florida. The other involves complaints by several female workers
against the Stroh Brewery in St. Paul, Minnesota.
Likewise, until recently there was almost no academic discussion of the tension between
free speech and equality values posed by many workplace sexual harassment claims, also
in direct contrast to the campus harassment issue. This contrast no doubt reflects the fact
that academics tend to be most directly concerned about their own environments. Of
course, free speech is especially important on campus, but not in terms of its overall
impact on the lives of average Americans. Rather, what happens in the nonacademic
workplaces where so many adults spend such a large percentage of all waking hours, is
of vastly more pervasive importance.
Because of the recent increase in complaints of sexual harassment, including those
based on expressive conduct, it is important to examine the free speech dimension of this
issue. While promoting women's equality in the workplace is an important goal, so too
is promoting free expression in the workplace.5 Moreover, history has demonstrated that
gender equality and free speech are mutually reinforcing, rather than antagonistic goals.
Therefore, overly broad limitations on expression should be avoided, not only to maximize
freedom of speech, but also to promote women's equality.
I will first summarize the general legal principles that govern whether expression in
the workplace may constitute punishable sexual harassment. I then discuss the application
of these principles to the two current cases on point, to illustrate how to accommodate
equality and free speech concerns in particular situations. Finally, I explain why overly
broad regulation of expressive conduct, under the rubric of sexual harassment, may well
undermine women's equality.
Applicable Legal Principles
Free Speech Principles
Expression that conveys sexist or sexual6 ideas is generally protected-along with all
expression that conveys ideas that particular audience members might consider objection-
able or offensive-when it is addressed to a general audience in a public setting.7 However,
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such expression may be unprotected in certain circumstances. For example, if it is repeat-
edly targeted directly at an individual even in a public setting, it may well amount to
proscribable harassment. Furthermore, in nonpublic settings, listeners may have privacy
rights which override a speaker's wish to address them, such as the right to be free from
unwanted intrusions into the home.8 The Court has held, though, that free speech values
may outweigh privacy concerns even in the home, requiring individuals to receive certain
unwanted communications there. 9
Restraints on unwanted expression may also be warranted where the speaker's audience
is "captive." Members of a captive audience are required to be in a particular place at a
certain time in order to pursue an important purpose. Given the significance of maintaining
freedom of speech, the Supreme Court has construed the captive audience concept nar-
rowly. It has ruled that, outside the sanctuary of the home, we usually bear the burden
of overlooking expression we find offensive.' 0
It could be plausibly argued that employees who are required to be at particular locations
in order to perform their jobs should be viewed as captive audience members. Some
courts" and commentators 2 have applied the captive audience theory to employees at
work. However, a recent article persuasively argues that "the Court has... never found
that employees in the workplace are 'captive,' and there are good reasons for it not to
do so.' 13 Moreover, even if employees were reasonably viewed as captive audiences in
certain workplace areas, that still would not justify the selective prohibition or punishment
of speech based on its content or viewpoint. 14 Therefore, workplace speech could not be
selectively punished for conveying discriminatory attitudes toward women.
Equality Principles
Important as free speech values are, equality principles are of comparable stature; there
is a right to equality of opportunity in employment regardless of one's gender. The special
importance of equality in employment was recognized in Congress' passage of Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which bars employment discrimination on the basis of
gender, along with other invidious classifications.' 5
Meaningful equality of opportunity in employment requires more than mere non-
discrimination at the entry level. It is not enough simply to open the doors of workplaces
to women; they must also have a full opportunity to participate and to succeed. Thus,
the courts 16 and Congress17 have recognized that employees should be protected from
harassment that is based on their gender. Moreover, courts have ruled that the prohibited
harassment may consist of words or expressive conduct.'8
Application of General Principles to Claims of
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace
The principles outlined thus far, as to which courts and commentators generally agree,
may be summarized as follows: sexist speech in a public forum is protected, but sexist
speech that harasses particular individuals in certain other settings, such as the workplace,
may be prohibited. So far, so good. But now we reach the difficult matter of applying
these broad principles to particular factual situations. What exactly is harassment? When
does expression cross the line between protected free speech and prohibited harassment?
As is often true in cases involving free speech and equality rights, the appropriate
resolution is highly fact-specific, depending on all the facts and circumstances involved
in the particular situation at issue. Relevant considerations include the following: Where
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is the speech taking place? Is it in a public forum or a nonpublic setting? Is it in a place
where the audience members have strong privacy interests? Is the audience "captive," in
that they are required to be in that place? Is the speech directly targeted at a single
individual or a small group of individuals, or is it addressed to a broader group? Is there
a hierarchical relationship between the speaker and the audience members? Different
constellations of answers to the foregoing questions can lead to differing conclusions as
to the protected or unprotected status of the particular speech at issue.
The American Civil Liberties Union recently refined its policy concerning sexual
harassment in the workplace, articulating criteria for the sometimes difficult task of line-
drawing between protected expression and prohibited harassment. That policy provides
the following definition of proscribable harassment:
Sexual harassment exists . . . [w]here conduct or expression is sufficiently pervasive or intense
that its effect on a reasonable person in those particular circumstances would be to hinder significantly
a person from functioning as an employee or to significantly adversely affect mental, emotional,
or physical well-being on the basis of sex. Conduct or expression that meets this definition is
actionable because of the unique characteristics of the workplace-including the existence of
authority relationships, the economic necessity to remain, and the limited opportunity to respond-
even though it might not be actionable in other settings. Such behavior need not amount to
constructive discharge, and is not immunized because expression is involved. Harassment under
this policy is actionable whether or not it was directed at any particular employee. '9
The range of situations can be illustrated through two scenarios, one from each extreme
of the spectrum between clearly protected expression and clearly unprotected harassment.
On the one hand, if an employee chooses to read Playboy Magazine in the employees'
cafeteria during his or her lunchbreak, that expressive activity should be protected, even
if other employees are offended by it. As the Supreme Court repeatedly has emphasized,
the mere fact that expression offends the sensibilities of some who are exposed to it is
not sufficient justification for restricting it; if it were, we would have no free speech.2 °
On the other hand, if a supervisor repeatedly directs unwanted sexually explicit remarks
to an employee, thus adversely affecting her ability to function effectively, that conduct
should be unprotected, even though it consists entirely of expression.
In between these extremes, reasonable advocates of free speech and gender equality
may disagree about the particular balance to be struck between these two sets of values.
For example, suppose a supervisor chooses to decorate his office with Playboy pinups
which are offensive to his assistant, who is required to spend much of her worktime in
that office; how should the balance be struck in that situation?
Two Recent Sexual Harassment Cases
Two recent, much-discussed cases pit the female employees' claims for relief from
sexual harassment against the free speech claims of other employees or of the employer:
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.2' and a lawsuit against the Stroh Brewery.
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.
Plaintiff Lois Robinson was one of a "very small number of female skilled craftworkers
employed" at the Shipyards.22 Her allegations of sexual harassment centered around "the
presence in the workplace of pictures of women in various stages of undress and in
sexually suggestive or submissive poses. ' ' 23 Although some evidence indicated that, on
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several occasions, sexually suggestive pictures were directed at Robinson herself, most
of the complained-of images were not directly targeted at her. 24 Nevertheless, they consti-
tuted the primary evidence upon which the district court relied in finding liability. 25
Likewise, the judge's remedial order was not limited to prohibiting employees from
forcing unwanted sexually explicit images upon Ms. Robinson or other female employees.
Rather, it broadly purged all "sexually suggestive" images-a category defined in sweepirig
terms26-from the workplace in general. Employees were not only prohibited from dis-
playing any "sexually suggestive" materials in public workplace areas, but they were also
barred from possessing, looking at, and displaying such materials in their own private
workspaces at any time." The judge's rationale for this sweeping order was the theory
that all sexually suggestive images of women undermine their equality, and thus lead to
violations of Title VII's prohibition on employment discrimination. 2"
The district court's ruling is currently on appeal before a federal appellate court. The
American Civil Liberties Union filed an amicus curiae brief in the appellate court which
challenged certain aspects of the lower court's order as transgressing free speech principles.
(Thus, the ACLU brief was in part supportive of, and in part divergent from, the positions
of both the female plaintiff and the defendant employer.)
Consistent with the fact-specific nature of all free speech issues, determining whether
the proscribed pictures are protected depends on various contextual factors. For example,
if male employees repeatedly attached nude photographs to a female employee's locker
or inserted them inside her locker against her wishes, that conduct-albeit expressive-
would clearly constitute unprotected harassment. On the other hand, if individual employ-
ees post nude photographs in their own lockers, without directly displaying them to any
other employee who does not want to see them, that conduct-even if offensive to some
employees-would clearly constitute protected expressive activity.
The management of Jacksonville Shipyards allowed its employees to post nude photo-
graphs of women on the walls of common work areas, but forbade the posting of any
other pictures in these areas. Under these circumstances, reasonable advocates of free
speech and equality could differ about whether the posting of nude photographs should
be protected. On the one hand, one could plausibly argue that the common areas are
important forums in which employees can express themselves through the posting of
pictures, and that the photographs were not directly targeted at other employees, hence
not constituting harassment. On the other hand, one could reasonably argue that employees
can express themselves through posting pictures on their own lockers, and should not be
free to impose any unwanted images upon objecting fellow employees, who are forced
to see them in the common areas.
The ACLU amicus brief in the Jacksonville case is sensitive to both of these plausible
views and argues for a remedial order that would foster both free speech and equality
values. The brief reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
[TIhe order bans the public display of "sexually suggestive" materials without regard to whether
the expressive activity is directed at any employee. . . .For this reason, . . this remedial provision
is overbroad. However, in light of the fact that [Jacksonville Shipyards] has itself historically
banned all public displays of expressive activity except sexual materials, this Court may wish to
consider the imposition of a workplace rule that would right the balance-i.e., encourage freedom
of expression while reducing the one-sidedness of the visual environment. Such a rule could require
the employer, if it permits the posting of sexual materials, also to permit the posting of other
materials-materials critical of such sexual expression, as well as other political, religious or social
messages, which are currently banned in the Jacksonville Shipyard workplace.29
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Throughout, the ACLU amicus brief in Robinson strikes an appropriate balance between
equality and free speech concerns, carefully distinguishing between protected speech and
punishable harassment. The thrust of the brief is captured in its Summary of the Argument,
which reads as follows:
The proper standard of liability for "hostile work environment" sexual harassment under Title
VII must be carefully crafted to reconcile the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech
and the right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace. In this case the relevant conduct
as alleged by Robinson consisted entirely of obnoxious and offensive speech or other expressive
activity. However, expressive activities cannot constitutionally be held to be unlawful "harassment"
simply because of their offensiveness.
The District Court did not undertake the proper inquiry in determining liability. Instead, the
District Court proceeded from the erroneous assumption that expression can constitute harassment
merely because an employee finds it offensive. Most of the expression relied on by the District
Court for its finding of harassment consisted of sexually explicit pin-ups, pictures, calendars, and
remarks, none of which was specifically directed at Robinson. Although there was evidence in the
record of comments specifically directed at Robinson, the District Court failed to make such a
finding. If it had found evidence of expression directed at Robinson, the District Court's inquiry
should have turned to whether Robinson suffered definable consequences that demonstrably hindered
or completely prevented her from continuing to function as an employee. The District Court likewise
failed to undertake this inquiry.30
The ACLU was specifically concerned that three of the district court's remedial orders
were overbroad and therefore violative of First Amendment protections. The brief ex-
plained:
Certain aspects of the District Court's remedial order are not narrowly tailored, and therefore violate
the First Amendment. First, the Order bans possession, reading and privately displaying "sexually
suggestive" materials. Second, it prohibits jokes and other comments "in the presence" of any
employee who objects. Third, it bans the public display of "sexually suggestive" materials without
regard to whether they are directed at any employee. These provisions amount to a prior restraint
on otherwise lawful speech, and are unconstitutionally overbroad.3
The court's prohibition on displaying "sexually suggestive" materials extended to a breath-
takingly broad range of pictures and photographs, given the court's open-ended definition
of the central term: "A picture will be presumed to be sexually suggestive if it depicts a
person of either sex who is not fully clothed or in clothes that are not suited to or ordinarily
accepted for the accomplishment of routine work in and around the shipyard and who is
posed for the obvious purpose of displaying or drawing attention to private portions of his
or her body."32 This sweeping definition encompasses innumerable items that employees
might legitimately choose to display or look at, including reproductions of countless artistic
masterpieces, numerous women's magazines and photographs of wives or daughters.
The ACLU brief's specific comments regarding the last of the three overly broad
remedial orders-the one banning the public display of "sexually suggestive" materials-
were excerpted above.33 Further guidance for drawing a line between protected expression
and prohibited harassment is provided by the brief's comments regarding the first two
overly broad remedial orders-those banning private displays of "sexually suggestive"
materials and jokes in the presence of an objecting employee:
[The Order] ban[s] possessing, reading, and privately displaying "sexually suggestive" materials.
• . . This ban would prohibit employees from keeping pornography in their backpacks or lockers
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or showing it to others discreetly in the locker room. Moreover, the Order's definition of "sexually
suggestive" is unnecessarily broad, as it could be construed to apply to photographs of family and
friends. Clearly there is no interest served by these prohibitions, particularly since the banned
expressive activity occurs in areas that other employees ordinarily could avoid.
Second, the Order overbroadly enjoins jokes and other speech "in the presence" of any employee
who objects. . . .There is a difference between some employees telling jokes that another employee
finds offensive, and other employees engaging in such joke-telling every time the offended employee
is within earshot, so as to taunt her. The former may be offensive and insensitive, but is protected.
The latter could well amount to a directed pattern of harassment. Any remedial . . . order must
reflect this distinction.34
The Stroh Brewery Case
Sweeping as the Robinson order was, in banning all sexually suggestive images from
the workplace, an even more sweeping ban on such imagery is being sought in a series
of cases pending before a state trial court in Minnesota.35 Female employees of the Stroh
Brewery in St. Paul, Minnesota have charged that a television advertisement for Old
Milwaukee beer, which is produced by Stroh Brewery, contributes to sexual harassment
in the brewery, and therefore should be banned from the air to remedy the harassment.36
The advertisement depicts a group of men on a fishing trip who fantasize that Old
Milwaukee beer is delivered to them by the Swedish Bikini Team, a group of bikini-clad
women. At the time of writing, this case had not yet proceeded to trial nor resulted in
any judicial ruling on the merits.
The plaintiffs allege that they were repeatedly subjected to targeted, unwanted physical
contacts and other sexual advances at the brewery. If the plaintiffs can substantiate these
allegations, they should be able to establish liability and to secure a remedial order
prohibiting any further harassment in the workplace itself.3 7 However, the remedial order
could not properly extend to the company's television advertisement. As commercial
speech, the advertisement is within the scope of First Amendment protection.3"
In support of their effort to limit the beer advertisement, the plaintiffs argue that it
contributes to a climate at its brewery in which sexual harassment is tolerated.3 9 This
attenuated, speculative causal connection between complained-of speech and anti-social
conduct is too remote to justify suppressing speech. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly
held, speech may only be restricted if it causes actual or imminent harm-i.e., if it creates
a "clear and present danger" of violence or illegality. For example, the Court has held
that advocacy of illegal conduct may not be prohibited on the theory that it might result
in such illegal conduct; only intentional incitement of illegal activity, which will immi-
nently cause such activity, may be proscribed. 4°
The argument that Stroh's television advertisements should be suppressed because they
might lead to harassment at Stroh's brewery is an attempt to revive the discredited "bad
tendency" test that was used to suppress speech earlier in -this century. 4' For example, in
decisions that it has subsequently overturned, the Supreme Court sustained convictions
of individuals who criticized the United States' role in World War I, on the theory that
such criticism might undermine national security.42 In contrast, at least since its 1969
decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio,43 the Court consistently has insisted that there must be
a very close causal connection between speech and any harm it will allegedly cause, for
the latter to justify suppressing the speech. The plaintiffs in the Stroh case should not be
permitted to turn the constitutional clock back to the World War I era, when an alleged
but unsubstantiated connection between speech and some societal danger was sufficient
to punish any controversial or unpopular speech.
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace
Overly Broad Restrictions on Expressive Conduct Disserve Gender Equality
As discussed above, some limited types of expressions may be prohibited in order to
protect the equality rights of women who must be in the workplace to pursue their jobs.
To broaden the range of prohibited expressive conduct, beyond the circumscribed criteria
set forth in the ACLU policy," would not only undermine the central guarantee of free
speech, but also would fail to serve the avowed purpose of advancing gender equality.
Throughout American history, measures designed to afford special "protection" to
women in the work force have in fact undermined women's full and equal participation.
Any overly broad restriction of sexually explicit speech in the workplace that is designed
to "protect" female workers would follow in this tradition. As the philosopher George
Santayana observed, "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."
Accordingly, a brief review of the relevant history is in order.
By the early twentieth century, more than half of the American states had enacted
some form of special "protective" labor laws for women workers. Some restricted women
from entire occupations or limited their hours of work. Others granted women benefits
that men did not enjoy, including a minimum wage, overtime pay, lunch breaks and rest
breaks. The classic defense of gender-based employment legislation intended to aid women
workers is contained in the Supreme Court's 1908 decision in Muller v. Oregon:a, "As
minors, though not to the same extent, she ["Woman"] has been looked upon in the
courts as needing especial care that her rights may be preserved. . [Sihe is properly
placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed for her protection may be sustained,
even when like legislation is not necessary for men, and could not be sustained.,
46
As the Supreme Court noted in 1974, in actual operation, these "protective" laws "put
women not on a pedestal, but in a cage., 47 This protective labor legislation at best was
only partially beneficial to women; historical evidence reveals that it always carried
concealed costs, such as the loss of jobs. Moreover, any doctrine resting upon the
incomparability of the sexes cannot be confined to circumstances that may at first appear
"beneficial"; the principle can always then be used to "justify" the denial of rights.
In today's context, singling women workers out for special "protection" could undermine
women's equality in additional ways. For example, invoking women's special reproductive
role, certain employers have excluded fertile women from jobs that entail exposure to
certain substances that might impair their fetuses, even if the women do not intend to
have children, and even though there is evidence that these substances could damage the
male reproductive functions as well.48
"Protectionist" measures designed to shelter women from sexually explicit expression
in the workplace conform to the general pattern of gender-specific "protectionist" mea-
sures, by actually operating to women's detriment. Regardless of the benevolent intent
of such measures, they in fact reflect and reinforce a patronizing, paternalistic view of
women's sexuality that is inconsistent with women's full equality. This point has been
made in a context highly analogous to the present one: the controversy over whether
certain "pornography," defined as "subordinating" to women, should be censored. While
some feminists advocate such censorship, others oppose it, in part because of its paternalis-
tic effect.49
For example, in 1985, the Feminist Anti-Censorship Task Force ("FACT") submitted
a brief opposing a city ordinance drafted by feminist pro-censorship advocates Andrea
Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon, which punished "pornography," defined as any
"sexually explicit subordination of women through pictures and/or words," as a violation
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of women's civil rights. To the contrary, the FACT brief argued, the Dworkin-MacKinnon
law would itself violate women's civil rights.50 That brief's warning words are also
applicable to overly broad restrictions on sexually explicit expression in the workplace:
The ordinance presumes women as a class (and only women) are subordinated by virtually any
sexually explicit image.
Such assumptions reinforce and perpetuate central sexist stereotypes; they weaken, rather than
enhance, women's struggles to free themselves of archaic notions of gender roles. . In treating
women as a special class, [this ordinance] repeats the error of earlier protectionist legislation which
gave women no significant benefits and denied their equality."1
Significantly, the analogy between the Dworkin-MacKinnon ordinance and overly broad
restrictions on sexually oriented expression in the workplace, under the rubric of sexual
harassment, has been noted by advocates on both sides of the Robinson case. On the one
hand, the attorney for Jacksonville Shipyards has relied on52 the judicial ruling invalidating
the Dworkin-MacKinnon ordinance in American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut."3 On the
other hand, a recent law review article that supports the Robinson ruling argues that,
"although the parallels between the cases are inviting, .... the Hudnut First Amendment
analysis simply does not apply to sexual harassment cases like Robinson. 54
Putting aside the legal distinctions, previously discussed,55 between measures limiting
speech in a public forum (as the Dworkin-MacKinnon ordinance would have done), and
those limiting speech in the workplace, the Dworkin-MacKinnon ordinance and restrictions
on sexually oriented workplace expression are still united by a common vision of the
harm that sexually explicit speech allegedly inflicts upon women. That vision, in turn,
reflects a concept of women's unique vulnerability to speech about sex-and, indeed, to
sex itself-that many feminists find antithetical to gender equality.
5 6
Reflecting the view of many feminists that the Dworkin-MacKinnon approach to sexual-
ly-oriented speech undermines equality, in 1991 and 1992, many feminists and feminist
groups opposed a proposed congressional statute that embodied the Dworkin-MacKinnon
philosophy-the Pornography Victims' Compensation Act.57 The opposing groups include
FACT, Feminists for Free Expression and various chapters of the National Organization
for Women, including its two largest chapters (in California and New York). For example,
Feminists for Free Expression explained:
Women do not require "'protection" from explicit sexual materials. It is no goal of feminism to
restrict individual choices or stamp out sexual imagery... Women are as varied as any citizens
of a democracy; there is no agreement or feminist code as to what images are distasteful or even
sexist. It is the right and responsibility of each woman to read, view or produce the sexual material
she chooses without the intervention of the state "for her own good." We believe genuine feminism
encourages individuals to make these choices for themselves.5.8
There is yet another reason why weakening free speech in the workplace may undermine,
rather than foster, gender equality: history has shown that a free speech regime is particu-
larly important to the cause of women's equality. Historically, the suppression of free
speech has been a major tactic of the anti-feminist movement. From 1873 until 1971,
the Comstock Act was used to suppress information about contraception and abortion.59
More recently, repeated attempts have been made to ban the feminist magazine Ms. from
high school libraries, 60 and the Supreme Court has approved the Department of Health
and Human Services' "gag rule," which prevented the millions of women served by
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federally-funded family planning clinics from receiving full and accurate information
about their reproductive options.6"
Advocates of social change, including feminists, have a special stake in preserving
freedom of expression. Therefore, the important goal of promoting meaningful gender
equality in employment, including the elimination of sexual harassment, must be pursued
through means that are consistent with free speech. In fact, measures that focus on sexually
oriented expression divert attention and efforts from the most significant causes of gender
discrimination.
Feminist scholars have identified the following as far more profound sources of women's
inequality in employment, as well as in society more generally, than the availability
of sexually oriented expression: "[the] sex segregated wage labor market; systematic
devaluation of work traditionally done by women; sexist concepts of marriage and family;
inadequate income maintenance programs for women unable to find wage work; lack of
day care services and the premise that child care is an exclusively female responsibility;
barriers to reproductive freedom; and discrimination and segregation in education and
athletics. 62 By targeting the foregoing problems, we can make meaningful contributions
to promoting women's equality, at work and in society at large, consistent with free
speech. In contrast, in terms of women's equality at work and elsewhere, overly broad
restrictions on sexually oriented workplace speech would do more harm than good.
Conclusion
General principles of free speech and equality must be applied to every particular sexual
harassment claim in a way that is sensitive to the specific facts involved, and that respects
both sets of concerns. To regulate expressive conduct more broadly than this article has
advocated would disserve both sets of principles. This conclusion is well stated in a letter
that Feminists for Free Expression sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee, opposing
the Pornography Victims' Compensation Act. It is applicable to the workplace sexual
harassment controversy too, because it underscores the reasons why overly broad restric-
tions on sexually oriented speech in the workplace would undermine women's equality,
as well as free speech:
Freedom of expression is especially important for women's rights. While messages reflecting
sexism pervade our culture in many forms, sexual and nonsexual, suppression of such material
will neither reduce harm to women nor further women's goals.
Censorship has traditionally been used to silence women and stifle feminist social change. It has
never reduced violence; it has led to the imprisonment of birth control advocate Margaret Sanger
and the suppression of such works as Our Bodies, Ourselves, The Well of Loneliness, and the
performances of Holly Hughes.6 a
There is no feminist code about which words and images are dangerous or sexist. Genuine
feminism encourages individuals to choose for themselves. A free and vigorous marketplace of
ideas is the best guarantee of democratic self-government and a feminist future.
Speaking of a "free and vigorous marketplace of ideas," I cannot think of a more
appropriate way to close than to thank all you speech and communications teachers, once
again-by way of acknowledging my own unforgettable, exceptional speech teacher,
Charles Caruson-for your invaluable contributions to that marketplace. So, thank you,
and keep up your great work!
Nadine Strossen
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